

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. [REDACTED]  
25X1A9a

Bob Amory concurs in [REDACTED]

recommendation.

gr  
JSE

11 April 1960

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

L CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

FILE CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## (47) OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief of Operations, DD/P	nt	18 APR 60
2	ADDP/A	CJB	10 apr
3	25X1A9a		
4	[REDACTED]		4/21/60
5	C/SRS/DDI		
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

## Remarks:

Dick:

25X1A9a

The boss does not think much of this proposal and asked what you and [REDACTED] thought of it.

To 4.

JSE

Agree

nt

~~To 4 Better not get into this sort of thing - very hard to turn to constructive advantage - too~~

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
EO/DCI [REDACTED] blp x-8823	18 Apr 60

Executive Registry  
60-2746

2746

6 April 1960

O-3037

25X1A9a

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** [REDACTED]  
221 - Admin Building

**SUBJECT:** Harrison Salisbury's Article in Saturday Evening Post,  
19 March 1960.

With respect to the Salisbury article, I would suggest the following steps might be worth considering.

1. Discuss at the OCB level whether there is agreement with
  - a. Salisbury's favorable interpretation of developments in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev;
  - b. His thesis that Khrushchev is seriously apprehensive over the ominous development of China;
  - c. His contention that Khrushchev in the long run will seek an alliance with the West against China;
  - d. His implied recommendation that US policy should move in that direction now.

2. In the light of the findings on the above, the OCB might determine whether

- a. The Salisbury thesis is one which is favorable to long range US interests and should be followed up tactically and operationally now;
- b. Any or all of his theses are detrimental to US interests and should be countered;
- c. His views are without real significance or impact, and should be ignored.

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
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11 DEC 1960  
CLASS. CHIEF: TO: TS S C  
NEXT REV'D: 04/01/61  
APPROV'D BY: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE: 8 JUNE 82 MAILED: 1034630  
DRAFTED: 8 JUNE 82

3. If his views are considered wrong and dangerous, appropriate action might be recommended by the OCB to various Departments.

4. With respect to CIA, our suggestion would be to labor with New York Times editorial personnel through whatever channels are available, to persuade them, preferably, to dissociate themselves openly from Salisbury's views, or at least not to come out in support of them.

I would suggest that such an exercise would be timely not in terms of Salisbury alone. There is a strong current of similar thought in Europe, centering around the so-called Starlinger Thesis. Even deGaulle is believed to be influenced by it. A review of our own long range interest would place us in a better position to react to European pressures in this direction which are likely to grow stronger in the future.

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Chief, SRS/DDI